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Book Reviews
Defense Reform

Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions:
The Mirage of Military Modernity
By Thomas-Durell Young
By Dr. John R. Deni, research professor of Joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational security studies, US Army War College

A

merican-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq have made clear over the last two decades that
interoperability is a crucial alliance capability. Effective coalition
military operations are made possible by common defense concepts,
doctrine, tactics, procedures, and materiel. Achieving these
interoperability objectives, however, has been a singular challenge
of the last 25 years, as Central and Eastern European allies have
sought to qualify for, join, and contribute effectively to the alliance.

New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2017

312 pages
Defense reform has been a critical tool for achieving
$135.00
interoperability across Central and Eastern Europe. Broadly,
defense reforms focused initially on adopting Western democratic defense
governance (what might be considered intellectual interoperability) and,
subsequently, on developing other interoperability objectives. Unfortunately,
these reforms have either failed or achieved only minimal success. According to
Thomas-Durell Young in Anatomy of Post-Communist Defense Institutions, Central
and Eastern European governments have been challenged deeply in their ability
to build and maintain capable, interoperable military forces. In fact, the military
capabilities of most allies have withered over the last quarter century, even as
efforts to build them up have accelerated over the same period.

Why? Young argues the key reason is the inability of Western officials to
acknowledge and appreciate the “malignant persistence of totalitarian norms” in
Central and Eastern European countries (7). In other words, even though the
formal structures of communism fell in the early 1990s, the thought patterns,
psychological outlooks, and behavioral habits characteristic to a totalitarian state
persisted far longer.
In the defense realm, this persistence has resulted in the retention of military
concepts contradictory to Western ideas. The blame for the subsequent failure
of most defense reforms, as far as Young assigns it, falls largely on the West. He
contends Western officials fundamentally misjudged the state of professionalism
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in Central and Eastern European militaries and mistakenly viewed the reform
of former communist armed forces as a military problem. As a result, most of the
West’s defense reform efforts focused on an overly technical approach geared
toward training at the tactical level.
If Young is correct, a generation of Western officials on both sides of the
Atlantic fundamentally misjudged the nature of post-Soviet, post–Warsaw
Pact, post-Tito societies, governments, and defense enterprises across Central
and Eastern Europe, resulting in wasted decades and billions of misspent
dollars, pounds, marks, and euros. This damning assessment deserves deep
analysis, both to determine whether Western officials really were as ignorant as
Young alleges and to identify accurately the key causal variable(s) behind the
defense reform failures.
Interestingly, Young presents evidence to support the notion Western officials
really did understand the shortcomings of and hurdles facing Central and
Eastern European military establishments. Leaked NATO defense assessments—
available to every Allied delegation in Brussels—and firsthand accounts of senior
Western military officials and experts portray a clear but limited awareness,
stemming from latent communist-era thinking and practices, of the challenges
faced by the Central and Eastern European defense enterprise (48, 49–52).
Young contends, after 1990, the West subsequently made no concerted effort
to understand the “cultural conditions” in Central and Eastern Europe (53).
If Western officials indeed were aware of persistent totalitarian norms, readers
have to wonder if they cared, or if they were overconfident in the ability of
Western-promoted defense reform efforts to succeed nonetheless.
At its heart, the book is about change in military organizations, a subject
that has seen significant attention from academics and practitioners over the last
several decades, particularly since Barry R. Posen’s foundational The Sources of
Military Doctrine (1984). While Young does include a brief survey of literature—
he specifically references academics Leslie Eliason, Theo Farrell, Emily Goldman,
Edgar Schein, and Terry Terriff—he focuses on his preferred explanatory variable:
cultural norms. For example, Young compares the explanatory power of cultural
norms to that of technology or of politics and strategy (explanatory tools posited
by other scholars). In this way, Young seeks neither to test theory nor refine
existing theoretical tools.
Instead, Anatomy offers a trove of evidence cataloging the transformation
of defense establishments across former Soviet and Warsaw Pact republics and
successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Young’s expertise and wide-ranging,
in-depth research shine here, allowing comparative analysis between and within
the three regions. He analyzes the countries of each region, covering defense
institutions, policy frameworks, defense planning techniques, national-level
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commands, military decision-making processes, operational concepts, logistical
support capabilities, and professional standards. The result is a comprehensive
overview of defense reform across nearly all of Central and Eastern Europe.
A second major strength is Young’s attention to practical and reasonable
recommendations—assuming readers agree the primary reason for the reform
efforts’ limited success is the West’s inability or unwillingness to consider
persistent totalitarian cultural norms. From broad recommendations—such as
promoting emphasis on achieving defense outcomes—to more regional- and
country-specific recommendations, policymakers and security experts will find
much utility in the book.
These recommendations naturally beg the question, do defense reform
outcomes make a difference in allied and partner military operations downrange?
Maybe not: even Young acknowledges, in some cases, impressive operational
outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan were not necessarily thwarted by lack of reform
progress (68). Nonetheless, Young pulls no punches in noting many NATO
allies in Central and Eastern Europe remain security liabilities, consuming more
security than they produce (179). Considering Russia’s current hybrid operations
and the continuing imperative of equitable burden sharing, NATO needs all allies
rowing in the same direction. Young’s impressively detailed and well-researched
book offers guidelines on how to achieve this synchronicity.
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Biography

The Blind Strategist:
John Boyd and the American Art of War
By Stephen Robinson
Reviewed by Colonel Jonathan Klug, US Army, assistant professor, Department
of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College

I

n The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Art of War,
Stephen Robinson unrelentingly attacks the military theory
of the brilliant yet controversial John Boyd and argues “Boyd
never applied the discipline of an historian to his research, he
was a blind strategist trapped in the darkness of fraudulent
history guided by the confirmation bias inherent within the
logic of his grail quest” (301). The majority of the book is consequently an examination of the poor use or outright falsification
of the history that underpins Boyd’s work, as well as the work
of his supporters. Through this study, however, Robinson does a
superb job providing a historiography of maneuver warfare.

Dunedin, New Zealand:
Exisle Publishing, 2021
360 pages
$35.99

For readers unfamiliar with Boyd, he was a highly influential US Air Force
fighter pilot and military theorist in the second half of the twentieth century. He
flew combat missions during the Korean War and his real influence began after
the war when developing his military theory. His most important contribution
was the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. OODA loops are tactical
decision cycles, and the side that completes these decision cycles faster than their
opponent will win the engagement. This theory led Boyd to write the Air Force
fighter doctrine, and he subsequently was instrumental in developing the F-16
and the F/A-18. In addition, Boyd expanded the idea of the OODA loop and
getting “inside your opponent’s decision cycle” from a simple tactical version to
a more robust operational version—the birth of what Boyd and his supporters
would call maneuver warfare (15).
In his first chapter, Robinson explores the emergence of maneuver warfare but
claims it is “a temple built on sand” (16). He proceeds systematically in 10 chapters
to describe the history on which Boyd based maneuver warfare. Highlights
include the blatantly fabricated history of the self-promoting Liddell Hart, the
Wehrmacht generals’ post-war efforts to distance themselves from Hitler and their
failure during World War II, the mythology surrounding German stormtroopers
and blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare and the defense of NATO, the absence of
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maneuver warfare in the Gulf War (1991), and much more. Robinson conducted
comprehensive research to support these chapters, demonstrated by an extensive
bibliography and frequent footnotes. Overall, Robinson claims “maneuver warfare,
was founded upon mythology, but this became apparent only after professional
historians exposed the historical fraud concocted by German generals and Liddell
Hart” (300).
Robinson does fine work exposing the issues with the history Boyd and others
used, yet there are aspects of maneuver warfare that remain useful. Robinson
depicts Boyd’s final OODA loop—which includes feedback loops and is useful for
the operational level—but does not explore the broader version of the OODA loop
in detail. Other aspects of maneuver warfare remain valuable and underpin the
United States Marine Corps warfighting operational concept. This information
raises the question of what exactly is an operational concept. In the 2001 Army
magazine article, “That Elusive Operational Concept,” David A. Fastabend
defined an operational concept as “an image of combat: a concise visualization
that portrays the strategic requirement, the adversary and his capabilities, and the
scenario by which that adversary will be overcome to accomplish the strategic
requirement. It is a governing idealization that addresses those activities necessary
to link tactical activities in a purposeful way to address the goals of strategy” (51,
no. 6). While Boyd and his supporters would likely argue maneuver warfare was
more than an operational concept, aspects of maneuver warfare still have merit as a
visualization or set of guiding principles for successfully conducting warfare.
In the cover blurbs, scholarly experts in military theory claim Stephen
Robinson’s book is a “must-read” and “Boyd’s advocates will not want to read, but
should” (back cover). They are right—military professionals and historians alike
should read this book and consider it deeply. Robinson makes a solid case that
the history Boyd and his supporters used to support their work was based on
falsehoods and even purposeful fabrications by Hart. This historical issue should
give anyone considering maneuver warfare cause to reflect if our existing doctrine
is built on flawed historical data. Although Robinson effectively hammers the
historical underpinnings of Boyd and maneuver warfare, aspects of maneuver
warfare are ideals military forces can and should attempt to achieve given
appropriate circumstances. The Blind Strategist is an excellent catalyst for thought
and debate.
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China

China Risen?
Studying Chinese Global Power
By Shaun Breslin
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald Krieger, US Army Forces Command

T

here is a cottage industry of books and articles on China
written by academics, independent researchers, and think
tanks, with more published every month. Shaun Breslin’s China
Risen? Studying Chinese Global Power, assesses China’s rising
global power while evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its
international objectives. Breslin is novel here, using Chinese
sources—including academic journals considered obscure even
within China—to present the vast and complex opinions within
the country. His approach is instructive and parts the complex
veil of its internal politics ever so slightly (225). Readers
walk away understanding the characteristics of geopolitical
discussions within China.

Bristol, UK: Bristol
University Press, 2021
316 pages
$35.99

In six chapters, Breslin evaluates China’s global blueprint and depicts the
country’s internal politics, grand strategy, ideological language, and soft power
quest. Some scholars have indicated China, despite its vast economic resources,
is still a partial power. While this point is still disputed, Breslin convincingly
makes a case that “whatever the threshold for being a global power is China
has already crossed it”—the transformation of the Chinese state is nothing short
of miraculous (3).
Breslin examines various aspects of China’s growing influence via hard
economic power, normative power, and soft-power ambitions. Over the past
few years, its quest for soft power through the popular Confucius Institutes has
generated controversy in the United States and Europe. Breslin suggests China’s
growing influence cannot be attributed to a single source of power, given the
myriad of circumstances and contemporary geopolitics. China’s leaders still
struggle to understand that soft power emanates from culture and industry and is
not wielded like hard-power economic instruments. Breslin admits his book omits
one key aspect of growing Chinese power via the military, but this topic is best
treated independently.

Book Reviews: China 155

Many analysts note China is a threat to American national security, citing its
Huawei 5G program or aspirations in the South China Sea. More often than not,
the threat is less clear-cut. There are many perspectives on the issue; Breslin writes:
“To be sure, it is not always clear what China is being identified as a threat to;
perhaps a different type of threat to different things for different people” (229).
The headlines surrounding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), implied to be
an example of Chinese “debt-trap diplomacy,” is another example that captures the
distortion around Chinese intentions (231).
While evidence shows several countries involved in BRI face loan repayment
issues, this discovery is still not proof of a deliberate policy. Breslin suggests there
are many actors in China who often act in ways that run counter to the objectives
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and “assuming a deliberate debt-trap
diplomacy strategy results in a focus on the wrong drivers and at times the
wrong actors” (231).
Complicating the narrative are China’s opaque lending practices, which
noticeably do not conform to Western lending practices. Within China, financial
support to developing nations is viewed as a way to secure national objectives, such
as ensuring access to vital natural resources like copper, iron, gold, and manganese
from Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Many state-owned enterprises
determine whether commercial activity is designed for profit or for securing
natural resources to support Chinese interests (130).
China is not the only influential global actor exerting influence in developing
countries, though the point is often missed. The nations of the Pacific Islands,
which typically have high debt levels, are an example. While China is the primary
lender for Tonga and Japan, other multilateral institutions serve as the primary
sources of loans and aid to other Pacific island countries. Breslin writes, “[i]f we are
worried about the causes and consequences of debt in these countries, then China
is part of the story and any potential solution. But not all of it” (233). Readers can
apply this template to the world, including many of China’s BRI partners. While
the CCP sets economic performance objectives and tightly controls the economy,
its new financial system is not the familiar neoliberal capitalism. In the video, “Is
China creating a new type of economic system?,” Barry Naughton dubs China’s
new system “capitalism with steerage” (University of Massachusetts Workshop,
2021). While the CCP touts slogans and single-focused objectives, many actors
pursue commercial profit-based agendas that at times conflict with state objectives,
creating dysfunctional outcomes with national policies (90). It would have been
helpful for Breslin to cover this newly emerging scholarship and research.
For the past several decades, countries have been quietly pushing back against
an American-led Western world order but have lacked the economic clout to back
up these challenges. China’s growing influence makes it the exception. Breslin
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admits, “[m]aybe just not being the West is enough to make China’s world view
attractive” (236). In the growing Sino-US challenge, there is ample room for a new
perspective. Breslin’s detailed analysis debunks the idea the world is shifting to a
global order fashioned by the CCP. A more realistic understanding of Chinese
intentions underscores a multipolar world where China’s objectives and decisions
increasingly influence the geopolitical landscape. The new world order will be
complex and challenging for any single country to lead or dominate (239–40).
Leaders in the West and the rest of the world must accept China’s new role and
influence in global affairs, despite disagreements with CCP leadership. Demonizing
China and misreading its intentions will only generate misunderstandings and
saber-rattling counterproductive in the new international order. A well-needed
addition to all bookshelves, China Risen is an asset to scholarship on China and
should be required reading for all senior military and civilian leaders involved in
crafting US policy.

Stronger:
Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age
of Competitive Interdependence
By Ryan Hass
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, distinguished fellow for China,
United States Institute of Peace

R

yan Hass—a central figure in early twenty-first century
US-China relations—has been engaged in the relationship
for two decades, active both in the trenches and at the apex of
power. He has written an insightful and illuminating book on
the subject, with insights and analysis informed by his firsthand
experiences from postings at the US embassy in Beijing and the
National Security Council as the China point person.
New Haven, CT:
In an era where the most enduring multidimensional Yale University
Press, 2021
240
pages
external national security challenge facing the United States is
$27.50
China, almost everyone seems to be an expert. Many of these
self-styled experts have penned books purporting to provide
key insights or uncover secret schemes. Of all the available tomes, Stronger is a
volume every national security professional should read. Why? First, the book—
written by an expert in the field—is a succinct primer for anyone seeking to
understand contemporary China policy. Hass has produced a masterful overview
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with authoritative analysis and sensible recommendations. He explains how
Washington and Beijing reached the current state of contention and confrontation
and reviews—in sufficient but not mind-numbing detail—all the critical issues,
including economics, technology, human rights, and military matters. Second, all
serious China policy players in the US government will have read it. Stronger is
likely the one book your boss has read or at least skimmed. Anyone who wants to be
effective in their job should be conversant with the analyses and recommendations
Hass outlines. Of course, not everyone will agree with what Hass writes.
The fundamental assumption of Stronger is “the old policy playbook for
managing U.S.-China relations no longer holds answers . . .” (5). According to Hass,
bilateral relations have evolved into a condition of “competitive interdependence”
whereby “[n]either country is capable of imposing its will on the other at
acceptable cost or risk, and yet both countries hold preferences and priorities that
place them at sharp odds with each other” (4). What policy prescription does
Hass recommend? He contends: “To compete effectively with China, America’s
leaders should focus on fostering greater national cohesion, restoring America’s
international prestige, and preserving its historically unmatched network of
alliance relationships” (9).
My main quibble with Stronger is the author’s excessive optimism about
America’s ability to negotiate skillfully the challenge of competing with China.
Hass asserts Beijing faces “the hardest governance challenge on the planet”
and contrasts this problem with the multiple factors that should give the United
States the clear advantage (192). Yet, Hass may significantly underestimate the
array and magnitude of domestic challenges confronting the United States.
In other words, America’s governance challenge may be as difficult as China’s.
Quibble aside, Hass rightly identifies the precondition for a successful US strategy
toward China—Washington must get it right at home.
Hass provides the best overview and analysis of contemporary US-China
relations I have seen in many years. In particular, uniformed and civilian
professionals of the US defense establishment should peruse the thoughtful and
thorough chapter five titled “Mitigating Risks of Conflict” (126). The Pentagon,
Hass suggests, will face difficult choices as it seeks “to align its capabilities with
its ambitions in an era of growing fiscal restraints” (153). Penned in unpretentious
and jargon-free prose, Stronger will appeal to a wide audience including national
security practitioners, policy wonks, educators, students, and anyone wrestling
with the long-term challenge China presents to the United States.
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Middle East

Negotiating Survival: Civilian-Insurgent Relations in Afghanistan
By Ashley Jackson
Reviewed by Dr. Heather S. Gregg, research professor of military strategy and
policy, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T

he sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the
Taliban’s takeover of the country in August 2021 caught
almost everyone off guard. Ashley Jackson, a scholar of armed
conflicts with over a decade of experience in Afghanistan,
has a provocative explanation for these dramatic events: “An
essential part of understanding the Taliban’s once-improbable
resurrection and ascent lay in their relationships with civilians”
(4). Specifically, in Negotiating Survival: Civilian-Insurgent New York: Oxford University
Press, 2021
Relations in Afghanistan, Jackson documents through 418
328 pages
interviews with civilians and members of the Taliban across
$45.00
15 provinces that, beginning around 2017, Afghan communities
and members of the Taliban began to actively negotiate and cut deals with one
another as a survival strategy. The end result of these negotiation was what Jackson
calls a Taliban “parallel bureaucracy replete with governors, courts, tax collectors
and even school monitors” (4). These shadow governments helped pave the way
for the Taliban’s rapid takeover of the country once it successfully negotiated the
complete withdrawal of the US military by the end of August 2021.
To more broadly explain this process of civilian-insurgent bargaining, Jackson
develops a framework that focuses on three variables: interests, including
civilians’ desire for survival and insurgents’ need for legitimacy and organizational
survival; leverage, including the use of coercion and violence, persuasion (the
story or narrative), and incentives, such as social services and other goods; and
social capital, which she defines as “not relationships and norms alone but the
new options and abilities that arise from them” (38). Through the combination of
these three broad variables, insurgents and the population navigate a complicated
relationship that recognizes each group’s needs and mutual dependency. Within
this theory, Jackson notes a few important caveats that shape these negotiations.
Critically, insurgents have far more power and leverage at the negotiation table
than do populations. Furthermore, insurgents who want political legitimacy are
more willing to negotiate than those that do not. She also contends that the more
senior and cohesive the insurgent group, the more likely it can successfully make
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and keep its agreements with the population and, similarly, the more unified a
community, the more likely it can bargain and negotiate with insurgents. Finally,
in most cases insurgents and the population do not easily have the option to walk
away from negotiations, unlike in business deals. It is this complicated mixture
of incentives, threats, and the dynamic relationship built between insurgents and
populations that produce reciprocal arrangements that are, at least in some ways,
mutually beneficial.
Jackson applies this framework specifically to Afghanistan to explain why the
U.S. led military strategy failed. Through her interviews and time spent in several
key provinces, she identifies where counterinsurgent forces failed to understand
the complex ways in which the Taliban worked with the population for their own
political survival and struck mutually beneficial agreements. She argues that “the
Taliban has been consistently underestimated by their opponents, in part because
their opponents focused almost exclusively on the Taliban’s acts of violence
and terror,” and discounted the many ways in which they collaborated with the
population for their compliance (213). She further notes that western strategists
assumed that an Islamic movement would be unyielding in its ideological aims
and, therefore, their eradication was the only option. By contrast, she finds that
pragmatism trumped ideology in Afghanistan, allowing for deviation from
maxims and dogma. Ultimately, she concludes that the Taliban succeeded in
attaining the population’s compliance through iterative negotiations over time and
that “ . . . compliance is not ‘won’ in a decisive victory. Rather it is mediated and
maintained through continual negotiation” (215). Jackson notes that bargaining
and negotiations worked particularly well for the Taliban in areas where it had
a degree of control and where military confrontation was minimal. Under these
conditions, the Taliban used negotiations with the population to consolidate
its gains. It also had greater responsibility to deliver goods and services to the
population, giving the population had some leverage with which to negotiate. In
areas that were militarily contested, the relationship between the population and
insurgents was less dynamic.
Jackson’s book is essential readings for scholars and practitioners who wish to
better understand the central role that populations play in shaping insurgencies
and their outcomes. Rather than assume that populations are passive bystanders
in an armed conflict, Jackson identifies the agency that they have and seeks to
understand the conditions under which populations, including women, can and do
negotiate with insurgents to shape their future. Alongside agency Jackson further
includes the role that emotions play in armed conflicts and negotiations, which is
another critical yet under-investigated topic in war studies.
Jackson’s research demonstrates that discounting or ignoring the role that
populations play in counterinsurgencies will most likely result in strategic failure.
She summarizes, “The neglect of civilian agency and behavior has fundamentally

160

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

impaired our understanding of how wars are fought and won or lost” (212).
This observation is particularly important when considering the priorities that
the U.S. military and its allies had in Afghanistan, including their focus on
building Afghan security forces, elections and the structure of the government
for building a viable state. Ultimately, while highly measurable pursuits, these
counterinsurgency strategies may not be successful if they do not include actively
include the population and recognize their role as active participants in the war
and its outcome.

Airpower in the War against ISIS
By Benjamin S. Lambeth
Reviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, chief of analysis and research,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

N

o one is a more respected or versatile commentator
about contemporary airpower than Benjamin Lambeth,
a nonresident senior fellow with the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments following a 37-year career at the
RAND Corporation. He has written books about American
air operations in Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO’s air
war for Kosovo, and Israeli air operations against Hezbollah.
His latest work, Airpower in the War against ISIS, examines
Annapolis, MD:
Operation Inherent Resolve over a four-year period, 2014–18, as Naval Institute Press, 2021
352 pages
US Central Command (CENTCOM) fought the Islamic State
$55.00
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As usual with his work, he provides
much to ponder for practitioners of airpower and leaders who want to apply it.
Lambeth pulls no punches. He begins by excoriating the Obama administration
for leaving Iraq in 2011 and permitting the conditions that led to the rise of ISIS.
After two years of increasing terrorist provocations and expanding incursions
resulting in the fall of Mosul, President Barack Obama finally authorized
Operation Inherent Resolve. Lambeth characterizes the air strikes in 2014 as
“half-hearted” and lacking serious purpose, typified by “unproductive gradualism
and misplaced targeting emphasis” (11). This initial “fundamental misjudgment”
of the character of the conflict by CENTCOM leadership produced a “needlessly
prolonged and costly air war” (218). By contrast, once the Trump administration
came into office in 2017, President Donald Trump authorized Secretary of
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Defense James Mattis to expand and intensify the air campaign, resulting in the
crushing of ISIS in little more than a year.
Lambeth is especially critical of restrictive rules of engagement that seemed
more concerned with limiting collateral damage than hurting ISIS. He argues
the campaign should not have been envisioned as counterinsurgency, with a focus
on winning hearts and minds, but instead ISIS should have been considered a
protostate meriting the application of more decisive force. He also argues then
CENTCOM Commander General Lloyd J. Austin III—and his chosen US Army
commander for the Operation Inherent Resolve Joint Task Force—misdiagnosed
their mission as primarily a ground war, and the campaign would have been better
served with an airman in charge of at least the initial phase of the operation.
Lambeth’s grasp of tactical details is impressive and less controversial. Air
operations to liberate Mosul and Al-Raqqah receive considerable attention, as does
the mission that killed jihadist leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He describes the
performance of various aircraft and weapons used during the campaign, including
the first combat sorties of the F-22 Raptor and new intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems.
The section about the Russian intervention in Syria is particularly insightful.
He describes the provocations and airspace challenges that ensued, along with a
number of combat actions. In one February 2018 incident, Russian mercenaries
and allies attacked an American special operations forces outpost. Americans
retaliated with punishing air strikes that killed as many as 200 Russian personnel—
but also led to the inadvertent bombing of Syrian government troops, revealing
human error has still not been eliminated from increasingly complex targeting
procedures. For both sides, the incident was “a windfall opportunity for reciprocal
learning” (175). The Russians were able to watch American air warfighting up
close and compare aircraft. In turn, US observers analyzed their aerial counterparts
for changes in air doctrine and employment. Though the Russians employed new
precision technologies, their air operations still had more in common with World
War II–era frontal aviation support than more dynamic American targeting.
Airpower in the War against ISIS is definitely a book of the COVID-19 era.
Its extensive documentation relies primarily on media reports and e-mails
to work around travel and access restrictions. Its greatest strength is also its
greatest weakness. Lambeth presents the airman’s view of Operation Inherent
Resolve in great detail, based on an impressive number of e-mail messages and
manuscript reviews ranging from senior US Air Force noncommissioned officers
to American and Australian Air Force generals. Lambeth’s analysis of the broader
aspects of American policy and the campaign would have benefited greatly from
a Joint and interagency approach that better examined other viewpoints for those
actions he criticizes. Some Iraqi commentary would also have been useful. While
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the book comes across as rather parochial, it is bound to be acknowledged as the
seminal work on the contributions of airpower in the war against ISIS, just as the
title promises.
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Urban Warfare

Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century
by Anthony King
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, principal, Innovative Defense Research

A

nthony King’s Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century
is an unusual book and a challenge to review. King seeks to
provide a new analytic approach to urban warfare, one providing a
“sociology of urban warfare” endeavoring “to transcend [previous]
disciplinary limitations by analyzing the interplay between
cities, weaponry, and forces in order to unite social and military
sciences.” The ultimate outcome is less successful in that regard
than as a presentation of the challenges and conditions inherent Medford, MA: Polity Press,
2021
when combat visits urban environments backed by impressive
288 pages
research spanning a broad spectrum of historical contingencies.
$69.95
While King provides fewer revelations for longtime students
of urban operations, he presents a potential resource for readers less familiar with
city fighting. As such, the book could complement Louis A. DiMarco’s Concrete
Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq (2012), Roger J. Spiller’s Sharp Corners:
Urban Operations at Century’s End (2000), other resources addressing specific urban
battles or other-than-combat urban disasters, and the many studies published
over the past 30 years that focus on specific aspects of urban undertakings.
The book lives up to King’s promise to take a force size-centric versus
environment-centric analytic approach. Its first half sets the stage writ large,
reaching deep into the past before reviewing what comprises a city from both
academic and pragmatic perspectives. Threats posed by irregular forces, the
evolution of the urban guerrilla, and the influence of city size and structure
on combat operations establish a foundation for chapters addressing military
capabilities in terms of “Air,” “Fire[s],” “Swarms,” “Partners,” and “Rumour”
(considers information and information operations in terms of conflicts in cities).
A final chapter, “Armageddon,” briefly contemplates the future of urban combat.
The strength of King’s offering is unquestionably his depth of research and fine
pen in presenting fighting during operations in Syria, Marawi on the Philippine
island of Mindanao, and Iraq’s Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul in addition to
many more distantly past operations. Belfast, Marawi, and Mosul receive special
attention to good effect. Even longtime students of urban operations will find
the occasional revelation rarely—if ever—found in previous publications. King
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wisely avoids the oversimplification of presenting cities as organisms, an analogy
that quickly breaks down in light of the inherent complexity of urban areas.
Interestingly, and perhaps deliberately as a way of sidestepping a related technical
discussion despite its relevance to social theory, the potentially illuminating
characterization of large urban areas as ecosystems is also foregone.
King rejects viewing cities in terms of their flows. Instead he suggests a
more appropriate approach is to appreciate them as consisting of groups and
interactions between them. Here his effort to convince regarding the applicability
of a sociological approach seems strained. Complexity makes such either-or
depictions of the urban character a hard sell. Comprehending this complexity
requires an inclusive approach when describing: density (also recognized by
King as a key descriptor), social groups and relationships, flows, overarching
system considerations (both internal to the city and in terms of the city as a
component of larger systems). All these terms offer benefits in pursuit of urban
area comprehension; one or two will not suffice to address the comprehension
conundrum fully. Anyone believing they fully grasp all that comprises an
urban area need only wait for a few moments before a city will present a
previously unseen nuance, relationship, challenge, or opportunity. Understanding
urban environments and operations is an unending pursuit rather than a
condition attained.
Use of Urban Warfare as an introductory text could ironically benefit
from King’s sometimes too narrow presentation of existing urban theory and
practice. Complementing his book or excerpts with readings offering alternative
explanations, different approaches, or contrary descriptions would serve as
stimulus for student discussions and written assignments. For example, the King’s
acceptance of what comprises a city as an entity (based on a threshold of 100,000
population or some combination of density and spread) overlooks the considerable
challenge of dealing with dramatically varied definitions of urban area and city
employed by academics, nations, and international bodies. Unhelpfully, the United
Nations has no single definition of urban area, instead using the country-specific
definitions of whatever countries they are operating in at the time.
King’s conclusion that “the congested, multidimensional challenges of urban
operations do not pertain below a dense population of 3,000” need not be incorrect,
but the implication that so fixed a demarcation holds notable significance implies
an operational importance that does not exist. The number, any number, is less
significant than other factors collectively meriting consideration during the
planning and conduct of urban operations. These and other considerations
regarding urban environments and combat in cities (for example, King’s conclusion
that urban warfare is more likely given smaller militaries in much of the world
today or his belief that “a successful information campaign requires networks of
true believers” rather than simply sufficient numbers of the naïve, ignorant, or
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gullible) will surprise readers intimately familiar with urban operations. While
there is much good in this book, readers looking to Urban Warfare as their initial
resource regarding urban warfare should read with a questioning mind and plan to
complement its reading with others’ thinking on the subject.

